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The Professional Education Earned
During Marriage: The, Case for Spousal
Support
Divorce is without question a great personal tragedy for both par-
ties involved.' Added to the personal trauma of the dissolution of
a marriage is the economic hardship that characteristically accompanies
divorce in our society.? Great concern has arisen among legal com-
mentators, legislatures, and courts about the disproportionate share
of the economic hardships that fall upon women following divorce.
3
Recent research reveals that when a couple had been married less than
ten years, the post-divorce per capita family income4 of the wife may
be only 48% of the pre-divorce per capita family income.' At the
same time, the post-divorce income of the husband may be as high
as 201 % of the pre-divorce per capita income. 6
Although many social and economic factors contribute to the dispar-
I. In addition to the personal havoc wreaked upon married couples and their families
who undergo a divorce, the impact of divorce on our society is similarly distressing. The rate
of marriages per 1,000 population in the United States has remained relatively stable from
1950 (11.1) to 1976 (10.6). Bureau of the Census, U.S. DEP'T OF COMRvMRCE, STATISTICA.
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1981 at 80 (102d ed. 1981). During the same period, the
rate of divorces per 1,000 population more than doubled from 2.6 to 5.4. Id.-Each year over
one million American marriages end in divorce. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social
and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1181, 1183 (1981). Projections indicate that by 1990 only 56% of the children in the
United States will spend their entire childhood with both natural parents. Glick, Children of
Divorced Parents in Demographic Perspective, 35 J. Soc. ISsuEs 170, 175 (1979); Weitzman,
supra at 1183 n.4.
2. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1241-64. The economic efficiency of two individuals work-
ing together as husband and wife is destroyed upon divorce with both former spouses bearing
some of the financial loss occassioned by the dissolution. See id. at 1249-50 (during the period
from 1968-1974 divorced men as a group experienced a 19% decline in real income and divorced
women experienced a 29% decline in real income while married couples experienced a 22%
increase).
3. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Greer v. Greer, 510 P.2d
905, 906 (Colo. App. 1973); Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1188-1264; Krauskopf, Recompense
for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital,
28 KANS. L. REv. 379, 380-88, 393-402 (1980); Comment, Equity and Economics: A Case for
Spousal Support, 8 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 443, 443-51 (1979).
4. Per capita family income is determined by dividing the total household income by
the number of persons in the household. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1244. Any spousal sup-
port and child support ordered by a court are subtracted from the total income of the husband
and added to the total income of the wife for the purpose of determining the per capita post-
divorce income. Id.
5. Id. at 1241-60.
6. Id.
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ity of post-divorce incomes between men and women, one situation
involves inequities that are particularly distressing. This is the situa-
tion that occurs when one spouse, typically the wife, works to support
the couple while the other spouse, typically the husband, obtains pro-
fessional education or training that substantially increases his earning
capacity.7 If divorce occurs shortly after the education is completed,
the student spouse leaves the marriage with all the benefits of the
increased earning capacity, while the working spouse shares in none
of the expected benefits that would have belonged to the community
had the marriage endured.8 Under California law, equal division of
the accumulated community assets of the couple9 is mandated upon
divorce.' 0 Most divorcing couples have few community assets to
7. Although precise statistics on the exact proportion of cases in which the wife works
to support the husband while he is in professional school rather than the reverse situation
are difficult to obtain, the overwhelming consensus is that the husband usually is the spouse
who receives the education while the wife works to support the couple. See Krauskopf, supra
note 3, at 387; Recent Developments, Professional Degrees as Marital Property, 6 Htv. WoiEaN's
L.J. 208, 209 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Recent Developments]. This conclusion also is sup-
ported by the fact that no major case dealing with the issue involves a situation in which
the wife was in school while the husband worked to support the couple. Comment, Til Degree
Do Us Part: The Community Property Interest In a Professional Degree, 18 U.S.F.L. REv.
275, 276 n.9 (1983); see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 442 A.2d 1062, 1067 n.4 (N.J. 1982)
"[B]ecause that has been the actual situation in all reported cases, the contributing spouse
is referred to as the wife." Id. The disproportionate hardship placed upon women in this situa-
tion also is confirmed by statistics demonstrating a greater disparity of post-divorce incomes
between former spouses whose pre-divorce income level was relatively high. Weitzman, supra
note 1, at 1242-43. This greater disparity can be explained by the fact that the husband in
this situation characteristically leaves the marriage with a fully developed career that often is
the result of an education obtained during the marriage, while the wife has sacrificed oppor-
tunities to enhance her own earning capacity to devote herself to domestic duties or support
of the husband while he obtained his education. Id. at 1210-21; Krauskopf, supra note 3, at
385-88. Perhaps the most compelling reason for seeking some remedy to the inequitable situa-
tion that exists after dissolution of a marriage during which one spouse contributed to the
education of the other spouse is that these economic sacrifices typically are made by the wife
and failure to provide an adequate remedy only aggravates the disproprotionate financial burden
resulting from divorce that women as a group already bear. Recent Developments, supra, at
212; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1249-60, 1264-68. This author addresses the inequities existing
in the particular situation involving the treatment of the professional degree upon divorce in
large part because the inequities do fall disproportionately on women as a group. Inequities
also may exist, however, when a husband supports a wife in obtaining a professional education
or training only to be deprived of the expected benefits due to a divorce occurring shortly
after the completion of the wife's education. Therefore, this author will use the term "working
spouse" to refer to the spouse who works to support the couple while the other spouse obtains
an education. The spouse who obtains the education will be referred to as the "student spouse."
8. In re Marriage of Sullivan, 8 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) 2165 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., 1982),
modified 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, reversed and remanded 37 Cal. 3d 762,
691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755,
758 (Minn. 1981); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527,.529-35 (N.J. 1982); see Bruch, The
Definition and Division of Marital Property in California: Towards Parity and Simplicity, 33
HASTINGs L.J. 769, 814-15 (1982).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE §687 (definition of community property).
10. Id. §4800(a).
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divide." This usually is the case when the couple has made sacrifices
in their standard of living to put one spouse through professional
school or training.' 2 The couple who decides to put one spouse through
professional school often will spend most of the community income
on educational and living expenses rather than acquiring any signifi-
cant community property.' 3 Therefore, the enhanced earning capacity
of the student spouse typically is far more valuable than any tangible
asset the couple owns.' 4 Recognizing the potential value of the educa-
tion or training one spouse received during marriage, many commen-
tators argued for the recognition of a property interest in the education
or training that could be divided between the spouses upon divorce."
To provide some relief for a contributing spouse upon divorce, courts
in some jurisdictions have recognized a property interest in an educa-
tion or training obtained during marriage.' 6
California courts, however, have refused to recognize a professional
education obtained by the student spouse during marriage as property
subject to division upon divorce.' 7 Consequently, under California case
law, the student spouse has been allowed to leave the marriage with
the enhanced earning capacity resulting from an education obtained
during the marriage.' 8 The working spouse, on the other hand, has
been denied any benefit from the enhanced earning capacity of the
student spouse that the couple expected to share at the time the educa-
tion was obtained.' 9
11. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1188-99. The median value of the total community proper-
ty owned by divorcing couples in California based on research done in 1978 was $10,900. Id.
at 1189. Almost 60% of the couples involved in the research had less than $20,000 net worth.
Id. at 1191. In a 1978 national survey, divorced women who reported receiving property received
a median award of $4,647. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Child Support
and Alimony: 1978, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 106 at 9 (1980).
12. Comment, supra note 7, at 282; Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 209.
13. Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 209; California Law Revision Commission,
Recommendation Relating to Reimbursement of Educational Expenses, 17 CAL. L. REvsIotN
COMI'N REPORTS 229, 233 (1983).
14. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-11; Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 381-84.
15. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-11; Bruch, supra note 8, at 813-21.
16. See infra notes 64 to 80 and accompanying text.
17. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134-35 (1961); In
re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461-62, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677-78 (1979),
overruled on other grounds In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 289,
166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1980); In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020,
209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). In reversing Sullivan, the California Supreme Court applied a statutory
provision governing reimbursement of community expenditures and did not recognize any property
interest in the education. 37 Cal. 3d at 765, 691 P.2d at 1021, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
18. See In re Marriage of DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981); Bruch, supra
note 8 at 814-15; Comment, supra note 7, at 282; Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 209;
Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 381-88.
19. Bruch, supra note 8 at 814-15; Comment, supra note 7, at 282; Recent Developments,
supra note 7, at 209; Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 381-88.
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In California, spousal support awards generally are based upon the
need of onespouse and the ability of the other to pay.2" Under this
traditional standard for awarding spousal support, the working spouse
who contributed to the education of the student spouse probably would
not be awarded any significant spousal support. 2' The primary reason
for this determination is that the working spouse had demonstrated
an ability for self-support by supporting the couple while the student
spouse was in school.2 2 Additionally, the depressed standard of living
the couple probably had to maintain while the student spouse obtained
the education would be considered by the court in determining if
spousal support was appropriate.23 The artificially lowered standard
of living the- couple maintained would reduce the amount of any
spousal support even if support was awarded to the working spouse.24
Thus, under the traditional rationale for spousal support in California,
the working spouse was unlikely to receive any significant award of
spousal support to ameliorate the disparity between the post-divorce
incomes of the spouses.25
In response to the growing awareness of the need to provide pro-
tection for the working spouse in this situation, the California
Legislature in 1984 passed Assembly Bill 3000 (AB 3000).26 Codified
in California Civil Code sections 4800, 4800.3, and 4801, AB 3000
requires reimbursement to the community of funds expended for an
education that substantially enhanced the earning capacity of one
spouse if the expenditures were made within ten years of the divorce. 27
AB 3000 also requires the court to consider, for the purpose of deter-
mining spousal support, the extent that the working spouse contributed
20. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801; see also Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 770, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209
Cal. Rptr. at 359 (Mosk, J. concurring and dissenting).
21. Comment, supra note 7, at 283-84.
22. Id. at 283-84; Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 399; see CAL. Civ. CODE §4801(a)(5) (court
must consider ability of supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without interferring
with the interests of dependent children in the custody of the spouse); In re Marriage of Mason,
93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 221-23, 155 Cal. Rptr. 350, 353 (1979) (legislative intent that supported
spouse seek self sufficiency through employment if able); In re Richmond, 105 Cal. App. 3d
352, 356-57, 164 Cal. Rptr. 381, 383 (1980) (purpose of support award may be to encourage
self reliance but must be reasonable).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801(a)(8).
24. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 399.
25. Comment, supra note 7, at 284.
26. 1984 Cal. Stat. c. 1661, §§1-5, at - (amending CAL. Crv. CODE §§4800, 4801; adding
CAL. CIV. CODE §4800.3); see Review of Selected 1984 California Legislation, 16 PAC. L.J.
643 (1985) (discussing Chapter 1661 provisions).
27. CAL. CIV. CODE §4800.3. The 10 year limitation is in the form of a rebuttable presump-
tion. Id. §4800.3(c)(1). Expenditures made longer than 10 years before the divorce proceedings
were commenced are presumed to have already substantially benefitted the community. Id.
§4800.3(c)(1).
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to the education of the other spouse if the education resulted in a
substantial increase in the earning capacity of the student spouse.28
Although reimbursement upon divorce of community expenditures
for the education of the student spouse does provide some remedy
for the working spouse, mere reimbursement of the educational costs
is rejected by legal commentators as an inadequate remedy for the
working spouse.2 9 Limiting the remedy of the working spouse to mere
reimbursement of the costs of the education does not protect the expec-
tation interest the working spouse had in an increased standard of
living.3" The working spouse, in essence, has invested in the enhanced
earning capacity or human capital" of the student spouse with the
expectation of receiving a return on the investment in the form of
a higher standard of living in the future.32 In addition, the out-of-
pocket costs of the education usually represent only a fraction of the
actual cost to the couple in terms of foregone income and consumption
opportunities while the student spouse was in school.33 The working
spouse often has sacrificed significant career or educational
opportunities.34 Reimbursement alone will not be adequate to com-
pensate the working spouse for these "opportunity costs" and does
not substantially address the basic inequities involved. 3
Any meaningful remedy for the working spouse in California must
come from the spousal support provision added to Civil Code sec-
tion 4801 by AB 3000.36 This new provision requires the court to
consider the extent the working spouse contributed to the education
or training of the other spouse when setting spousal support.3 The
unresolved question, however, is whether this new provision is capable
of providing adequate relief for the working spouse, given the judicial
reluctance to award support if the spouse seeking support has
demonstrated even a minimal ability for self support.38 The California
28. Id. §4801.
29. Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 215; Comment, supra note 7, at 294; Krauskopf,
supra note 3, at 393, 414-15.
30. Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 215; Comment, supra note 7, at 294; Krauskopf,
supra note 3, at 393, 414-15.
31. See infra notes 48 to 63 and accompanying text (discussing concept of human capital).
32. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 380-88, 391-95; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1217-18.
33. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 384. The "opportunity costs" involved in foregoing the
income that the student spouse would have earned had he not been in school may constitute
as much as 74% of the total actual costs in acquiring a college education. Id.
34. Bruch, supra note 8, at 818; Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 387.
35. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 387.
36. 1984 Cal. Stat. c. 1661, §3, at - (amending CAL. CIV. CODE §4801).
37. CAL. CiV. CODE §4801(a)(1).
38. In re Marriage of Mason, 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 221-23, 155 Cal. Rptr. 350, 353 (1979);
In re Richmond, 105 Cal. App. 3d 352, 356-57, 164 Cal. Rptr. 381, 383 (1983); In re Marriage
of Winick, 89 Cal. App. 3d 525; 529, 152 Cal. Rptr. 635, 636-37 (1979).
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Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Sullivan39 recently acknowledged
the requirement that trial courts consider the contribution of the work-
ing spouse for the purpose of setting spousal support.4" Justice Mosk,
however, in a concurring and dissenting opinion, stressed that the
issue of support was not before the court and that spousal support
generally is awarded on the basis of the needs of one spouse and
the ability of the other to pay, implicitly suggesting that the new
spousal support provision works no significant change.4'
This author will examine the controversy surrounding the treatment
of a professional education upon divorce. 2 The various approaches
taken to this problem in jurisdictions other than California will be
surveyed. 3 The California position prior to the enactment of AB 3000
will be discussed."' Finally, AB 3000, the statutory response in Califor-
nia, will be considered.45 This author contends that the new spousal
support provision in AB 3000 is capable of supplying a basis for relief
upon divorce for a working spouse who has contributed to the educa-
tion of a student spouse.
46
TREATMENT UPON DIVORCE OF A PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
EARNED DURING MARRIAGE
Many courts and commentators have wrestled with the question
of the treatment upon divorce of a professional education earned dur-
ing marriage. The concern over unduly encumbering the career and
economic future of the student spouse has been recognized clearly.
The following discussion of the concept of human capital as related
to investment in a professional education will provide the theoretical
basis for protecting the interests of the working spouse. 7
A. The Professional Education and Investment in Human
Capital
During marriage, a couple usually functions as an economic unit,
seeking the maximization of benefit to the community rather than
39. 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
40. Id. at 767, 691 P.2d at 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
41. Id. at 770, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
42. See infra notes 48 to 124 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 64 to 80 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 81 to 124 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 125 to 145 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 146 to 188 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 48 to 63 and accompanying text.
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either individual.4" By pooling resources of time and skill, providing
support and encouragement, and allowing for specialization of duties,
the family economic unit ideally provides the individual spouses a
higher standard of living than they would be able to enjoy separately.
49
In furtherance of this goal, a married couple often decides to con-
centrate on developing the human capital of one of the spouses.
5 1
Human capital is a form of wealth widely recognized by economists
that can be described as the acquired useful skills and knowledge of
an individual." The working spouse supporting the couple while the
other spouse obtains an education or training that will provide a sub-
stantially enhanced earning capacity, in effect, is making an invest-
ment in the human capital of the student spouse and the family unit
as a whole.2 If not for the working spouse, the student spouse would
have to obtain capital to invest in the education from other, more
expensive sources such as banks, and the cost of the education might
become prohibitive.53
The typical working spouse/student spouse situation has four basic
characteristics. 54 First, the couple shares the loss of the foregone earn-
ings of the student spouse during the period of the education. 5 Since
most student spouses seeking a professional education or training
already possess undergraduate degrees, the couple may sacrifice
substantial earnings while the student spouse is in school. Second,
the working spouse provides the financial capital that allows the stu-
dent spouse to forego those earnings.5' Third, the working spouse
may forego opportunities to develop his or her own earning capacity."
Finally, both spouses expect to gain a return on the full costs of the
investment through a higher standard of living during the marriage.5"
When divorce occurs shortly after the education is completed, the
expectation the working spouse had of sharing in the higher standard
of living is frustrated. Conversely, the student spouse leaves the mar-
48. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 381-88.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 380, 384-88; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-12.
51. 1979 Nobel Prize winner Theodore W. Schultz has maintained that much of the rise
in economic output in this country is attributable to a real growth in worker productivity resulting
from the steadily growing amount of human capital per worker. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 381.
52. Id. at 386-88; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-11.
53. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 384-85.
54. Id. at 380-86.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.; see, e.g., Lynn v. Lynn, 453 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 1982). At the time of their
marriage, both husband and wife were interested in pursuing graduate degrees but only the
husband obtained a professional education during their nine years of marriage. Id.
58. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 380-86.
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riage with all the benefits of the enhanced earning capacity that the
education provides. Since most working spouses in this situation are
women, 59 the failure to provide any significant remedy for the work-
ing spouse further aggravates the post-divorce disparity of incomes
between men and women.6" Leaving the working spouse without an
adequate remedy appears contrary to the interests of justice and may
discourage the beneficial investment in professional educations by work-
ing spouses. 61
Most commentators, utilizing the theoretical basis of investment in
human capital, have argued that the legitimate expectation of the work-
ing spouse should be protected either by recognition of a property
interest in the professional education of the student spouse62 or by
providing compensation to the working spouse." Courts of various
jurisdictions have struggled with the problem of providing a fair solu-
tion for both parties involved. The following section briefly examines
some of the solutions prescribed by courts in jurisdictions other than
California.:
B. Judicial Treatment of the Professional Education Upon
Divorce
Courts in numerous jurisdictions have been called upon to provide
relief for a working spouse claiming some interest in the professional
education of a student spouse. A majority of the courts considering
this issue have held that the professional education is not property
6 4
and that the working spouse has little or no financial interest in the
degree. 65 The refusal to recognize a property interest in the profes-
59. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1241-59; Krauskopf,
supra note 3, at 395-409.
61. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 395; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210. But see In re Mar-
riage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, ... 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 801-02 (1982) partially
reversed and remanded, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984) (concurring
opinion by Kaufman, Acting P.J:) (expenditure of community funds for the education of one
spouse is made with a donative intent and not with the expectation of receiving compensation
upon divorce).
62. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-21; Bruch, supra note 8, at 813-21. As community
property, the value of the professional degree would be divisible upon divorce. CAL. Civ. CODE
§4800(a).
63. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 398-416; Comment, supra note 7, at 293-99; Recent
Developments, supra note 7, at 216-19.
64. Comment, supra note 7, at 279.
65. Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (the intangible character
of an education meant value could not be characterized as property subject to division); Frausto
v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (professional education acquired during
marriage is not a property right and is not divisible upon divorce); In re Marriage of Graham,
574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978) (educational degree has none of the attributes of property and
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sional education is attributable to the view that a professional educa-
tion fails to fit within traditional definitions of property. 66 Further-
more, a professional education is difficult to value,67 and courts hesitate
to encumber the future earnings of the educated spouse.68 In a recent
Florida decision, the court expressed concern that awarding a wife
a vested interest in the education of the husband "would transmute
the bond of marriage into the bonds of involuntary servitude con-
trary to the [thirteenth amendment] of the United States
Constitution." 
69
Other courts, however, have been more responsive to the plight
of the working spouse.7 Growing judicial inclination to provide some
remedy for the working spouse upon divorce is exemplified by a New
Jersey Supreme Court opinion stating: "Marriage should not be a
free ticket to professional education and training without subsequent
obligations. This Court should not ignore the scenario of the young
professional who after being supported through graduate school leaves
his mate for supposedly greener pastures."
' 7'
A few courts sympathetic to the predicament of the working spouse
have found a property interest in the professional education earned
during marriage or the enhanced earning capacity the education
represents.72 The courts recognizing the professional education as prop-
erty, however, usually have limited the remedy of the working spouse
to the cost of the education.73 The method for evaluating the amount
cannot be distributable as marital property); In re Marriage of Goldstein, 423 N.E.2d 1201,
1204 (Il1. App. 1981) (enhanced earning capacity represented by degree is not marital proper-
ty); Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (1982) (enhanced earning capacity earned dur-
ing marriage is not vested but is a mere expectancy dependent upon future success and efforts
and is not marital property subject to distribution upon divorce); DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W.2d
761, 767 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (cannot put dollar value on a professional education or degree).
66. Wisner v. Wisner, 631 P.2d 115, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (education too intangible
for value to be characterized as property); Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981) (professional education acquired during marriage is not a property right).
67. DeWitt v. DeWitt, 296 N.W,2d 761, 767 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
68. See Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 215-16.
69. Severs v. Severs, 426 So. 2d 992, 994 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
70. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Horstman,
263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977); Hubbard v. Hub-
bard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
71. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 535 (N.J. 1982).
72. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Horstman,
263 N.W.2d 885, 891-892 (Iowa 1978); Lynn v. Lynn, 7 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) 3001 (N.J. Super.
Ct., Ch. Div. 1981) reversed and remanded 453 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982); O'Brien v. O'Brien,
452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 1982).
73. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268-69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of
Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891-92 (Iowa 1978). The trial court in Lynn v. Lynn, 7 Fam.L.Rep.
(BNA) 3001 (N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. Div. 1981) reversed and remanded 453 A.2d 539, utilized
a capitalization of earnings approach to arrive at the award for a wife who had worked to
support her husband while the husband attended medical school and performed his internship.
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awarded often has been ambiguous.7" The limitation of the remedy,
to the cost of the professional education seemingly is inconsistent with
the definition of the education as property." This inevitably results
in tortured reasoning. In a Kentucky appellate decision, for example,
the court held that a professional degree falls within the definition
of property only in cases when divorce occurs early in the marriage
and little property has been acquired.
76
Other courts have avoided making a determination that the profes-
sional education is marital property subject to division upon divorce.
Instead, these decisions have provided a remedy of compensation for
the contributions of the working spouse on the basis of restitutionary
interests to prevent unjust enrichment. 77 Jurisdictions that utilize
equitable restitutionary principles such as implied contract broadly in-
terpret property division or spousal support statutes to allow com-
pensation for contributions to the welfare of the other spouse.7"
In California, compensating a spouse for contributions to the welfare
of the other spouse generally is not considered with regard to proper-
ty division 79 or spousal support. "° Civil Code section 4801, as amended
by AB 3000, provides an exception to this general principle in the
case of contributions by a working spouse to the education of a stu-
dent spouse. The next two sections will examine the absence of a
remedy in California for the working spouse prior to the enactment
of AB 3000. This lack of remedy primarily resulted from the reluc-
Id. The trial court calculated the value of the education by determining the earning differential
between an average person with the husband's current level of education and the average per-
son with the level of education the husband had prior to the marriage, but the New Jersey
Supreme Court reversed and opted for the remedy of reimbursement. 453 A.2d at 541. See
also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982) (case decided the same day as Lynn
providing reimbursement alimony upon divorce for a wife's contributions to her husband's
education).
74. See supra note 73.
75. Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 214; Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 413-16.
76. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
77. See, e.g., Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P.2d 623, 627 (Okla. 1977) (nonterminable alimony
of $35,000 awarded to wife who supported spouse while he was in medical school); Hubbard
v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750-51 (Okla. 1979) (traditional equitable principles for prevention
of unjust enrichment justify compensation to a wife for her investment in her husband's educa-
tion); Magruder v. Magruder, 209 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Neb. 1973) (gross alimony of $100,000
awarded wife as compensation for contributions to husband's increased earning capacity, con-
ditioned on wife not remarrying); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn.
1981) (equities heavily in favor of providing a remedy for the working spouse).
78. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 403-09.
79. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4800(a) (community property divided equally upon divorce).
California has emphasized developing independence between the spouses based on principles
of equality. 6 B.WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNiA LAW, Husband and Wife, §162, at 5030-31
(8th ed. 1974).
80. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1221-31; Comment, supra note 7, at 283-85, 293-94; Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 444-69.
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tance of California courts to recognize the professional education as
property.
C. California Case Law
California courts have been hostile to the recognition of any prop-
erty interest in a professional education or the enhanced earning
capacity the education represents."' This position is based upon an
adherence to the definition of property decided upon in Franklin v.
Franklin.82 The Franklin court held that property divided in a divorce
action must have certain attributes, namely, being susceptible to owner-
ship in common, to transfer, and survival.13 Under this narrow defini-
tion of property, a professional degree could not be classified as prop-
erty of any kind, since the degree cannot be alienated, is personal
to the holder, and has no value independent of the future efforts
of the person holding the degree.84
The court in Todd v. Todd,85 applied the restrictive Franklin con-
cept of property subject to division upon divorce in holding specifically
that a professional education was not property. The Todd court relied
upon the fact that the professional education had none of the attri-
butes of traditional property and held that the education was too dif-
ficult to value for purposes of division. The reasoning in Todd was
followed in the case of In re Marriage of Aufmuth. s8 The Aufmuth
court refused to allow the introduction of evidence to prove the value
of the legal education earned by the husband during the marriage,
holding that the education was not community property. 9 Relying
81. Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rotr. 131, 135 (1969); In re Marriage
of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677 (1979) reversed on other
grounds In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 289, 166 Cal. Rptr.
853, 857 (1980); In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 484, -, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796,
800 (1982) reversed and remanded 37 Cal. 3d 762, 768, 691 P.2d 1020, 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr.
354, 357 (1984).
82. 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945). The issue before the Franklin court involved
a cause of action the husband had acquired for personal injuries. Id. at 719-20, 155 P.2d at
638-39.
83. Id. at 725, 155 P.2d at 641.
84. See Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135; Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App.
3d at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 677, reversed on other grounds In re Marriage of Lucas, 27
Cal. 3d 808, 815, 614 P.2d 285, 289, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853, 857 (1980); Sullivan, 134 Cal. App.
3d at -, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800, reversed and remanded 37 Cal. 3d at 768, 691 P.2d at
1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
85. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969).
86. Id. at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 134-35.
87. Id.
88. 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979), reversed on other grounds In re Mar-
riage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
89. 89 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 677-78.
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on Todd, the Aufmuth court held that the legal education of the hus-
band was "manifestly of such character that a value for division cannot
be placed upon it." 9
In re Marriage of Sullivan"' is the most recent California case to
consider whether a working spouse who has helped the other spouse
obtain an education during marriage is entitled to compensation or
an interest in the education itself.9 2 Sullivan involved a husband who
had obtained his medical degree and completed his internship and
residency while his wife worked to support the family. 3 Upon divorce,
the trial court refused to admit evidence regarding the value of the
medical degree.14 The original opinion of the court of appeal held
that while a professional education or license is not community
property, g" the education or license may be the separate property of
the student spouse.9 6 The appellate court further held that the trial
court should determine whether the degree has an economic value,
and, if so, the community should be entitled to at least a reimburse-
ment of the costs of the degree. 97
Upon rehearing, however, the court of appeal modified the original
opinion in the case.98 The second decision of the court held that a
professional education acquired during marriage is not community pro-
perty or separate property of the individual who earned the degree."
The court of appeal in the modified decision relied upon the defini-
tion of property expounded in Franklin, Todd, and Aufmuth, holding
that a professional education does not possess the requisite attributes
of property subject to division. 00 The concurring opinion stated that
a spouse who assists the other spouse in obtaining an education general-
ly does not do so with the expectation of compensation.' 10 The concur-
90. Id.
91. 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
92. Id. at 765-766, 691 P.2d at 1021-23, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 355-57.
93. Id. at 765-66, 691 P.2d at 1021-22, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56.
94. Id.
95. 127 Cal. App. 3d 656, 8 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) 2165 (Calif. Ct. App., Jan. 8, 1982),
modified on reh'g 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982), partially reversed and
remanded 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
96. 8 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) at 2166. The education or license could not be community prop-
erty because the degree is merely the culmination of a life-long educational process and therefore
cannot be said to have been acquired during the marriage. Id. See also the modified court
of appeal decision in Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at -, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 803-04 (Ziebarth,
J., concurring and dissenting).
97. 8 Fam.L.Rep. (BNA) at 2166.
98. 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982), partially reversed and remanded
37 Cal. 3d. 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
99. 134 Cal. App. 3d at - , 184 Cal.Rptr at 800.
100. Id.
101. Id. at - , 184 Cal. Rptr. at 801-02.
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rence considered this assistance to be made with donative intent, giving
rise to a presumption of gift.'
Justice Ziebarth, who authored the original court of appeal opin-
ion in Sullivan, dissented from the modified decision, arguing that
the majority adopted too restrictive a definition of property. 03 The
dissent contended that the refusal to recognize the professional educa-
tion as an asset did not comport with other California decisions
recognizing various intangible assets as property.' 4 The dissent also
complained of the great injustice of denying at least some compensa-
tion to the working spouse upon divorce. 05 Finally, the dissent disputed
the claim that the degree or the proper measure of remedy would
be too difficult to value.'
0 6
The California Supreme Court did not decide Sullivan for two years
after granting a hearing in 1982. The final decision of the court,
rendered on December 31, 1984, held that AB 3000, which had been
passed in 1984, controlled the disposition of the issue in Sullivan."7
Before examining the specific provisions of AB 3000, this author will
analyze briefly the California position regarding a remedy for the work-
ing spouse prior to the enactment of the legislation.
D. Analysis of the California Position Prior
to Assembly Bill 3000
Several reasons may be advanced to explain the refusal of California
courts to recognize a professional degree as property subject to divi-
sion at divorce. First, as expressed by the leading cases, a profes-
sional degree does not fit the traditional definition of property.' The
degree cannot be alienated, is personal to the holder, and has no value
independent of the efforts of the person holding the degree.'0 9
Under the principle of equal division of community assets,"' classi-
102. Id.
103. Id. at -, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 804-12.
104. Id. at -, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 806-814 (examples of intangible assets recognized by
courts are non-vested pension rights, contingent retirement benefits, and term life insurance
benefits).
105. Id. at -, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 811-25.
106. Id. at -, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 814-25.
107. 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
108. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135; Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d
at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 677; Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at - , 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800,
reversed and remanded, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
109. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135; Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d
at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 677, reversed on other grounds In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal.
3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980).
110. CAL. CIw. CoDE §4800(a). The result of this classification presumably would apply
regardless of whether the non student spouse supported the student spouse while the latter
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fication of the professional degree as community property would en-
title the non-educated spouse to a one-half interest in the increased
earning capacity represented by the degree. " ' This result is viewed
by California courts as creating a hardship on the educated spouse
by mortgaging away one-half of the future earnings of the educated
spouse." 2 The educated spouse may not be successful or may not
wish to remain in the profession."' In these cases, an award of one-
half the present value of the enhanced earning capacity seems harsh.
Under California community property law, recognition of a com-
munity property interest in the enhanced future earning capacity
represented by an education is inconsistent with the community prop-
erty principle that income earned after separation is separate
property."' One court, while applying the separate income principle
to the valuation of another intangible asset, business goodwill, stated:
"Since the philosophy of the community property system is that a
community property interest can be acquired only during the time
of the marriage, it would then be inconsistent with that philosophy
to assign to any community interest the value of the post-marital ef-
forts of either spouse."' 
5
Many legitimate concerns surround the recognition of a marital prop-
erty interest in the professional education earned during marriage.
These concerns, however, do not justify the refusal to provide some
remedy for the working spouse. Additionally, many of the arguments
against recognizing a property interest in the enhanced earning capacity
are subject to criticism.
The fact that a professional degree does not fit within the narrow
confines of the traditional definitions of property does not necessari-
ly preclude recognition of a property interest or some alternative
remedy. California courts have recognized several intangible assets for
distribution upon divorce." 6 Since the rule of equal division of com-
obtained the degree. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 415-16. If the degree or education is property
acquired during the marriage, then the education is community property in which both spouses
have "present, existing, and equal interests." See CAL. CrY. CODE §5105 (nature of interests
of parties in community property).
111. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-21; Bruch, supra note 8, at 813-21.
112. Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 677, reversed on other grounds
In re Marriage of Lucas, 27 Cal. 3d 808, 614 P.2d 285, 166 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1980). See also
California Law Revision Commission, supra note 13, at 234.
113. See Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938 (App. Div. 1982) (enhanced earning
capacity resulting from an advanced education or professional degree is merely an uncertain
expectancy dependent upon future success and efforts).
114. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§5118 (earnings of separated spouse are separate property); 5119
(earnings after legal separation are separate property).
115. In re Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384, 388, 109 Cal. Rptr. 914, 918 (1973).
116. E.g., id. (business goodwill); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 841-48, 544
P.2d 561, 562-66, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633. 634-39 (1976) (nonvested pension rights).
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munity assets precludes major adjustments to the property distribu-
tion to avoid an inequitable disparity of incomes following divorce,'
7
courts should look beyond the traditional property definitions to deter-
mine whether an asset actually is a form of wealth created by com-
munity efforts." 8 Refusal to classify the professional education as com-
munity property may not preclude recognition of the degree as the
separate property of the student spouse." 9 The alleged difficulty of
valuing the professional degree has not prevented courts from
evaluating potential earning capacities or other contingent expecta-
tions in tort or contract actions.2 0 Numerous commentators and courts
have suggested formulas and methods for providing an accurate valua-
tion of the interest or of the compensation required for the working
spouse.' 2 '
The fundamental defect of the California position prior to 1984
was that by attempting to avoid possible inequitable treatment of the
student spouse, the courts ignored the needs of the working spouse,
who ultimately was deprived of any repayment for contributions to
the enhanced earning capacity of the student spouse. 2 2 Since most
117. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§4800(b)(1) (court allowed to award any asset to one party to
effect a substantially equal division of the property), 4800(b)(2) (court allowed to make adjust-
ment from party's share for any sum determined to have been deliberately misappropriated
to the exclusion of the community or quasi-community property interest of the other party),
4800(b)(3) (court allowed to award all assets to one party if total amount is less than $5,000
and the other party cannot be located).
118. See Bruch, supra note 8, at 818-21; Comment, supra note 7, at 278-79, 286-87; Recent
Developments, supra note 7, at- 210-211.
119. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at -, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 802-25 (concurring and dissenting
opinion by Ziebarth, J.) reversed and remanded 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1984).
120. See Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 388-90 (investments in human capital protected); see
also Thrifty Drug Stores, Inc. v. Workers Comp. Appeals Ed., 95 Cal. App. 3d 937, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 459 (1979) (calculating future earning capacity in workman's compensation case); Rodriguez
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1978) (calculating
lifetime earning capacity in personal injury case).
121. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 401; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1218-21; Comment, supra
note 7, at 287-91. See generally Fitzpatick & Ducette, Can the Economic Value of an Educa-
tion Really be Measured? A Guide for Marital Property Dissolution, 21 J. FAM. LAW 511,
514-524 (1983) (value of degree based on incremental change in earning capacity); Mullenix,
The Valuation of an Educational Degree at Divorce, 16 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 227, 268-83 (1983)
(value of degree based on labor theory of value). Justice Ziebarth, in his dissent to the modified
appellate court decision in Sullivan, suggested three alternative measures of recovery: (1) the
actual expenditures of community funds and efforts for the education, (2) the value of income
foregone by the community by reason of having the student spouse in school, and (3) the
differential between the earning capacity of the student spouse at the time of the marriage
and at the time of the divorce procedings. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at -, 184 Cal. Rptr.
at 815.
122. Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 215-16; see California Law Revision Commis-
sion, supra note 13, at 233-34; Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-21; Bruch, supra note 8, at
813-21; Comment, supra note 7, at 282-85.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 16
working spouses in this situation are women,' 23 a failure to provide
an adequate remedy increases the disproportionate financial burdens
of divorce that women bear.' 24
In response to these problems, California passed Assembly Bill 3000.
AB 3000 provides for reimbursement of community expenditures for
the education of the student spouse and requires the court to con-
sider the extent to which one spouse has contributed to the education
of the other for purposes of setting spousal support. The provisions
of AB 3000 will be analyzed to determine if this enactment provides
a fair and adequate remedy for the working spouse.
ASSEMBLY BILL 3000
At the root of the hardships facing the working spouse following
divorce are the disproportionate income levels likely to result between
the student spouse and the working spouse. Providing an adequate
solution to this problem necessitates acknowledging the harsh economic
realities facing the working spouse following divorce. The California
Legislature attempted to ameliorate the inequities facing the working
spouse with the enactment of AB 3000.
A. AB 3000 Provisions
The dissent in the second appellate decision in Sullivan argued that
a spouse who worked to support the other spouse in obtaining an
education resulting in an enhanced earning capacity should be entitled,
upon divorce, at least to reimbursement of the community funds
expended for the costs of the education. '25 In 1983, the California
Law Revision Commission recommended the remedy of reimburse-
ment to the community of funds expended for the education of the
student spouse.' 26 The Commission considered reimbursement to be
the most equitable remedy for both parties,'27 since a more substan-
tial remedy would create a windfall for the working spouse.' 28
123. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
124. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1241-68; Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 216-19.
125. 134 Cal. App. 3d at __, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
126. California Law Revision Commission, supra note 13, at 233-36.
127. Id. at 235. "The Commission does not believe that it would be either practical or
fair to classify the value of the education, degree, or license, or the enhanced earning capacity
as community property and to divide the value upon marriage dissolution. Classification of
these items as community property would create problems involving management and control,
creditors rights, taxation, and disposition at death, not to mention the complexities involved
in valuation at dissolution." Id. at 234.
128. Id. at 234. The Commission also declined to advocate any change in the established
support scheme attempting to rectify any discrepancies in the earning capacities between the
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In response to the recommendations of the Law Revision Commis-
sion, the California Legislature passed AB 3000,"29 which added sec-
tion 4800.3 to the Civil Code. Section 4800.3 provides that upon
divorce, the community must be reimbursed for community contribu-
tions to the education or training of a spouse that results in a substan-
tially increased earning capacity. 3 The reimbursement may be reduced
or modified as justice requires.' If the education does not enhance
substantially the earning capacity of the student spouse, any expen-
ditures of community funds do not come under the reimbursement
provision and the student spouse is not forced to pay for a valueless
degree.' 32 Moreover, reimbursement would not be required if the educa-
tion increases the income of the spouse who would otherwise require
support.'33 In this situation, the supporting spouse already has received
a benefit from the education the student spouse received because the
spousal support burden is reduced."'
The Law Revision Commission advised against disrupting the spousal
support system to deal with the problem of the treatment of the pro-
fessional education upon divorce, stating that the reimbursement pro-
vision alone would be the best solution.' 35 The legislature, however,
amended section 4801 of the Civil Code which requires the court to
consider various factors surrounding the circumstances of the parties
in determining whether and in what amount spousal support should
be awarded.' 36 One of the factors the court is required to consider
two former spouses. Id. The Commission did note the possibility that the existing support scheme
requires the student spouse to support the working spouse while the working spouse receives
an equivalent education. Id. at 234 n.6; see CAL. Civ. CODE §4801(a)(9) (court required to
consider any other factors deemed just and equitable for purpose of spousal support).
129. 1984 Cal. Stat. c.1661, §§1-5, at -.
130. CA. CIV. CODE §4800.3. "Community contributions" include payments made with
community property for education, training, or repayment of a loan incurred for education
or training. Id.
131. Id. §4800.3(c). Several circumstances may warrant a reduction or modification. Id.
The community already may have substantially benefited from the community contributions.
Id. §4800.3(c)(1). Section 4800.3 establishes rebuttable presumptions that the community has
not substantially benefited from the contributions if made less than 10 years prior to the com-
mencement of the dissolution proceeding and that the community has benefited substantially
if the contributions were made more than 10 years prior to the commencement of the pro-
ceeding. Id. §4800.3(c)(1). The education or training received by a party may be offset by
education or training received by the other party for which community contributions have been
made. Id. §4800.3(c)(2). Finally, the education or training may enable the educated party to
engage in gainful employment that substantially reduces the need of the party for support that
would otherwise be required. Id. §4800.3(c)(3).
132. California Law Revision Commission, supra note 13, at 235.
133. Id. at 236.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 234-35.
136. In addition to the earning capacities of each party the court must consider the needs
of each party, the obligations and assets of each party, the duration of the marriage, the ability
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is the earning capacity of each spouse.' 37 When considering the earn-
ing capacities of the spouses under the new provision, the court must
take into account "the extent to which the supported spouse con-
tributed to the attainment of an education, training, or a license by
the other spouse. ' 38
Section 4800.3 of the Civil Code specifically provides that reim-
bursement to the community is the exclusive remedy for expenditures
made for the education or enhancement of earning capacity of one
spouse. 39 This section, however, also provides that this exclusive reim-
bursement remedy is not intended to limit the consideration of the
effect of the education on the circumstances of the parties for pur-
poses of setting spousal support. 4 ' Commentators have maintained
that mere reimbursement of the actual funds expended by the work-
ing spouse is an inadequate compensatory remedy.'4' The out-of-pocket
costs of the education usually are not as great in value as the foregone
opportunities for greater income during the marriage if the student
spouse worked rather than attended school.' 42 The costs of the educa-
tion also do not reflect the opportunities for education or training
that the working spouse passed up in order to support the student
spouse.' 43 These "opportunity costs" reflect the true cost of the educa-
tion the student spouse receives and usually far exceed the out-of-
pocket expenses incurred for the education.' 4 Additionally, mere reim-
bursement of educational costs does not begin to address the gross
inequities regarding the disparate post-divorce incomes of men and
of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment, the time required for the supported
spouse to acquire appropriate education, the age and health of the parties, and any other factors
that the court deems just and equitable. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801(a); see In re Marriage of Rosen,
24 Cal. App. 3d 885, 101 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1972) (court must consider circumstances of parties).
137. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801(a)(1). In making this consideration, the court is required to
take into account the extent to which the earning capacity of the supported spouse has been
impaired by reason of unemployment during the marriage to allow the supported spouse to




141. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-21; Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 395-409; Bruch, supra
note 8, at 816-21; Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 215-18; Comment, supra note 7,
at 293-99.
142. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 386-88; Bruch, supra note 8, at 818-19.
143. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 386-88; Bruch, supra note 8, at 818-19; Weitzman, supra
note 1, at 1210-11.
144. The opportunity costs may amount to as much as 74% of the total investment costs
in acquiring a college education. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 384. The working spouse may
incur other types of opportunity costs as well. For example, Janet Sullivan quit a full-time
job to move with her husband as he pursued his internship and residency following medical
school. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 765-66, 691 P.2d at 1021-22, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56 (1984).
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women.' 5 If the working spouse is to have any substantial recompense
for the benefit conferred upon the student, the working spouse must
look to the new spousal support provision in Civil Code section 4801.
B. Spousal Support Under Assembly Bill 3000
Spousal support in California generally is awarded on the basis of
the inability of the supported spouse to provide self-support and the
ability of the supporting spouse to pay.' 46 Courts encourage in-
dependence and complete separation of the parties by limiting the
amount and duration of spousal support.'4 7 Contrary to the popular
myth that a divorcee lives comfortably on the income of her former
spouse, research indicates that spousal support is awarded to women
only in approximately 17% of divorce cases.' 8 The amounts awarded
increasingly are smaller and limited to a shorter period. 49 Additionally,
Civil Code section 4806 prohibits a spousal support award when there
are no children from the marriage and an award would be wholly
unnecessary to provide for the proper support of the supported
spouse.' 0 Any award of spousal support to the working spouse under
AB 3000 must overcome the judicial reluctance to award support to
a spouse who has demonstrated an ability to work.'"' If the spouse
145. Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 212. Professor Weitzman found that the disparity
of post-divorce incomes between men and women was greatest in the higher income levels where
the husbands were more likely to have a professional education. Weitzman, supra note 1, at
1242-44.
146. CAL. CIw. CODE §4801. The court considers the earning capacity of the spouses, the
extent to which one spouse contributed to the education of the other resulting in an enhanced
earning capacity, the needs of each party, their obligations and assets, the duration of the
marriage, the ability of the supported spouse to engage in meaningful employment, the time
required for the supported spouse to acquire education, training and employment, the age and
health of the parties, the standard of living of the parties and any other factors the court
deems just and equitable. Id. See also Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1184-85 (focus of support
law shifted from fault to issues of ability to pay and financial need); Comment, supra note
3, at 452-56, (factors considered in setting spousal support).
147. In re Marriage of Mason, 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 155 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1979) (legislative
intent for supported spouse to be encouraged to seek employment); In re Richmond, 105 Cal.
App. 3d 352, 164 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1980) (support award may be structured to encourage self
reliance).
148. Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make a Difference,
14 FAm.L.Q. 141, 143 (1980); Bruch, supra note 8, at 774.
149. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 148, at 142-46; Comment, supra note 3, at 443, 451-69.
150. CAL. Crw. CODE §4806. Section 4806 also permits a court to refuse to award support
out of the separate property of one party if the other spouse has a separate estate or income
sufficient for support. Id.
151. Comment, supra note 7, at 284. In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Sullivan,
Justice Mosk reacted to the possibility of spousal support under AB 3000 by stating: "I point
out that the issue framed in this case does not involve the element of spousal support. That
is to be awarded generally on the basis of the needs of one spouse and the ability of the
other to pay. . . ." 37 Cal. 3d at 770, 691 P.2d at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
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seeking support has demonstrated the capacity for self-support, the
court is not likely to award spousal support." 2 This is true even though
the consequence may result in a gross disparity of income following
divorce. I 53
Another factor the court will consider when setting spousal sup-
port is the standard of living the couple enjoyed during the marriage. 
5 4
When a couple has made economic sacrifices during marriage to put
one spouse through school, the marital living standard probably will
be depressed artificially, further discouraging a court from awarding
spousal support.'"1 The duration of the marriage in these cases typically
is short, lessening the likelihood of a significant award of spousal
support.' 56 Additionally, estimating the earning capacity of the stu-
dent spouse at dissolution of a shorter marriage, before the student
spouse has attained peak earning potential, may not provide an award
commensurate with the actual financial situation of the parties.'"
The new provision in Civil Code section 4801 requires the court,
when setting spousal support, to consider the extent the working spouse
has contributed to the attainment of an education.' 58 To have any
independent significance, this new provision must have effect when
necessary to avoid injustice regardless of the demonstrated ability of
the supported spouse for self-support.'59 If the employment of a work-
ing spouse effectively will preclude any award of spousal support,
the new language in Civil Code section 4801(a)(1) is meaningless.' 60
The resulting denial of spousal support would be the same under the
previous version of section 4801(a)(1).' 6' Although the new provision
152. In re Marriage of Kelly, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 95, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259, 266 (1976);
Comment, supra note 7, at 284; Comment, supra note 3, at 452-71; Comment, Rehabilitative
Spousal Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma,
12 U.S.F.L. Ry. 493, 508-13 (1978)[hereinafter cited as Comment, Rehabilitative].
153. See Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1251 (men experience 42% improvement in standard
of living while women experience 73% decline following divorce).
154. CAL. CiV. CODE §4801(a)(8).
155. Comment, supra note 7, at 284; Comment, Rehabilitative, supra note 152, at 502-05.
156. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d 762, 691 P.2d 1020, 209 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1984) (marriage lasted 10 years); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982) (eight
years); Lynn v. Lynn, 453 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (seven years); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa,
309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981) (six years).
157. Comment, Rehabilitative, supra note 152, at 499-502.
158. See CAL. CIV. CODE §4801(a)(1) (consideration of earning capacity); Comment,
Rehabilitative, supra note 152, at 505-08 (earning capacity of the supporting spouse).
159. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 399.
160. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801(a)(1).
161. See 1983 Cal. Stat. c. 302, §7, at - (amending CAL. CIv. CODE §4801). Under
prior law section 4801(a)(I) required the court to consider only: "The earning capacity of each
spouse, taking into account the extent to which the supported spouse's present and future earn-
ing capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were incurred during the marriage
to permit the supported spouse to devote time to domestic duties." Id. See also CAL. CIV.
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does not represent a sweeping change in the California spousal sup-
port scheme, the legislature clearly has recognized that mere reim-
bursement to the community does not address adequately the inequities
existing in this situation." 2 In Sullivan, the California Supreme Court
recognized the availability of spousal support based, at least in part,
upon consideration of the extent of the contributions of the working
spouse. 6 '
The spousal support provision in AB 3000 is only one considera-
tion among several that the court must take into account.' 4 Any reluc-
tance to award justified spousal support ignores the reality of the
economic consequences of divorce, particularly as they impact upon
women.' 65 Courts must develop some policy basis for addressing
spousal support under the new Civil Code section 4801 provision.
Judicial inability to define objectives clearly may result in continued
denial of support to working spouses.
1. Basis for Awarding Spousal Support
In California, spousal support cannot protect the full expectation
interest of the working spouse who supported a student spouse in
obtaining an education. 66 To protect the expectation interest, the court
would have to award support approximating one-half of the projected
value of the enhanced earning capacity of the educated spouse.' 67 This
result has no basis in the California spousal support scheme.' 6 Fur-
thermore, this outcome is tantamount to recognition of a community
property interest in the professional education and is precluded by
Civil Code section 4800.3, which provides that reimbursement of the
CODE §4801(a)(5) (court required to consider ability of supported spouse to engage in gainful
employment).
162. See Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 766, 691 P.2d at 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357 (spousal
support available in additional to reimbursement). The legislature added the spousal support pro-
vision to AB 3000 even though the Law Revision Commission recommended making no change
in the support scheme. See California Law Revision Commission, supra note 13, at 234.
163. Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 766, 691 P.2d at 1023, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357. Justice Mosk,
however, in his partial dissent, stressed that spousal support was still to be based on the need
of the supported spouse and the ability of the other spouse to pay. Id. at 770-71, 691 P.2d
at 1025, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
164. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801.
165. See generally, Weitzman, supra note 1; Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 148; Krauskopf,
supra note 3; Seal, A Decade of No-Fault Divorce: What It Has Meant Financially for Women
in California, Fmis. ADVOCATE 10 (Spring 1979).
166. Comment, supra note 7, at 283-85.
167. See Bruch, supra note 8, at 810-15; Recent Developments, supra note 7, at 215-16;
Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210-20. See generally Mullenix, The Valuation of an Educational
Degree at Divorce, 16 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 227, 268-83 (1983).
168. See In re Marriage of Burlini, 143 Cal. App. 3d 65, 191 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1983) (pur-
pose of spousal support to provide financial assistance as appropriate).
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costs of the education is to be the exclusive remedy of the
community. I9
A better analysis for determining standards to implement the new
support provision would focus upon the disparity of earning capacities
between the two spouses after divorce resulting from the misalloca-
tion of the opportunity costs of obtaining the professional education. "'
Both spouses make sacrifices during marriage to allow the student
spouse to obtain the professional education.' 7 ' As noted earlier, signifi-
cant opportunities in terms of lost income to the student spouse,
7 2
and opportunities for enhancement of earning capacity by the work-
ing spouse,' 7" often are foregone. Upon divorce, the disparate income
levels that often result between the two spouses are a function of
the allocation of the opportunity costs incurred during marriage.
The working spouse incurs opportunity costs in terms of a decreased
standard of living during the marriage and foregone educational and
career opportunities. These opportunity costs are part of the true cost
of the education obtained by the student spouse.' 74 The working spouse
is willing to bear these costs with the expectation of sharing the benefits
of the enhanced earning capacity of the student in the future. If divorce
occurs before the community has received a substantial benefit from
the education, the working spouse leaves the marriage still bearing
the opportunity costs. The couple usually accumulates little property
for division due to the lower standard of living during the period
the education was obtained. Additionally, the working spouse may
have sacrificed better opportunities for education or employment. The
student spouse, on the other hand, leaves the marriage with the enhanc-
ed earning capacity and none of the continuing opportunity costs.'"7
AB 3000 properly focuses attention upon the effect of the oppor-
tunity costs incurred in obtaining the education on the earning
capacities of the spouses. 76 After recognizing that the earning capacities
of the spouses have been affected greatly by the opportunity costs
that have fallen disproportionately upon the working spouse, courts
169. See Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 776-71, 691 P.2d at 1023-26, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 357-60
(Civil Code sections 4800, 4800.3 and 4801 govern issue of compensation for spouse who has
contributed to the education of the other during marriage).
170. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 380-88, 413-15.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 30 to 35 and accompanying text.
173. Weitzman, supra note 1, at 1210; Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 386-88.
174. Krauskopf, supra note 3, at 386-88.
175. But see CAL. CIv. CODE §4800.3(b)(2) (incorporating former CAL. CIv. CODE
§4800(b)(4) (any loans remaining at divorce that were incurred from the student spouse's educa-
tion are assigned to the student spouse upon divorce).
176. CAL. CIV. CODE §4801(a)(1).
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should have little difficulty developing a basis for a spousal support
award designed to apportion the burden of these costs more equitably.
Two possible approaches to setting spousal support are suggested in
the following section.
2. Spousal Support Alternatives Under AB 3000
Courts have broad discretion in making spousal support awards.'
77
The alternative methods available to achieve a just support award
should remedy any unfair disparity of post-divorce incomes between
the spouses attributable to the misallocation of the opportunity costs
of the professional education obtained during marriage.' 78 Two alter-
natives a court could employ are considered in this subsection: 1)
rehabilitative spousal support; and 2) support based upon the impair-
ment of the earning capacity of the working spouse due to the circum-
stances of the marriage.
a. Rehabilitative Spousal Support
The first alternative a court should consider is rehabilitative spousal
support.' 79 This would involve requiring the educated spouse to sup-
port the non-educated spouse while the non-educated spouse pursues
a similar educational or training opportunity. 8 ' The new support pro-
vision in Civil Code section 4801 demonstrates that rehabilitative sup-
port is an acceptable application of spousal support.' 8 ' If the working
spouse has the desire and the ability to pursue an educational oppor-
tunity similar to that of the student spouse, rehabilitative support has
several advantages. This remedy gives the working spouse the same
opportunity to enhance earning capacity that the student spouse was
given. The value of the opportunities each spouse receives will be
roughly equal. The education or training provided for the working
spouse will help eliminate the income disparity following divorce. Sup-
port would not be required beyond the period the working spouse
is in school if the education or training is successful.' 82 This aids in
177. In re Marriage of McNaughton, 145 Cal. App. 3d 845, 852-53, 194 Cal. Rptr. 176,
179 (1983) (abuse of discretion setting spousal support will be found only if no judge would
reasonably make the same order under similar circumstances).
178. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 148, at 174-76.
179. See California Law Revision Commission, supra note 13, at 234 n.6.
180. See Morgan v. Morgan, 366 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. 1975), modified, 383 N.Y.S.2d
343 (App. Div. 1976) (trial court ordered husband to support wife while she obtained educa-
tion similar to that the husband obtained during marriage).
181. CAl.. CIV. CODE §4801(a)(1).
182. See id. §4801(e). Section 4801(e) allows the court to order a party to submit to an
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terminating unnecessary contact between the parties as quickly as possi-
ble following divorce. Many working spouses, however, will not be
able to take advantage of this type of rehabilitative support due to
age, child-care responsibilities, lack of scholastic qualifications, or in-
clination. Therefore, this remedy will be rather limited in application.
b. The Impaired Earning Capacity of the Working Spouse
The working spouse may have incurred substantial opportunity costs
that impaired the earning capacity of the working spouse. The working
spouse may have foregone substantial educational or career oppor-
tunities. The requirements of the education or career of the student
spouse may have necessitated a move that required the working spouse
to leave full-time employment in which the working spouse had accum-
ulated seniority or acquired specialized skills."s3 A court should consider
how much the earning capacity of the working spouse was impaired
by the circumstances of the marriage. 8 ' Balancing any impairment
of the earning capacity of the working spouse against the earning
capacity and the expected standard of living of the student spouse,
the court should award support designed to reduce the disparity of
post-divorce incomes between the spouses. The income of the working
spouse would be included in any support determination.' The fact
that the working spouse would be capable of self support at a minimal
standard of living should not bar an award of spousal support. This
support scheme would ameliorate the harsh injustice of allowing only
the student spouse to enjoy a much higher standard of living as a
regult of the education obtained with the assistance of the working
spouse.
The new support provision embodied in section 4801 gives more
weight to the enhanced earning capacity of the student spouse when
the circumstances of the parties are considered. The fact that the stu-
dent spouse has a greatly enhanced earning capacity due in part to
the efforts of the working spouse should outweigh, in many cir-
cumstances, the fact the working spouse has demonstrated some ability
for self-support. To deny the working spouse support in this situa-
examination by a vocational training consultant. Id. This provision could provide the court
with the necessary information to determine whether education or training would be successful.
183. See Sullivan, 37 Cal. 3d at 765-66, 691 P.2d at 1021-22, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56
(wife left full-time job to follow husband as he pursued his medical internship and residency).
184. The consideration of the impact of the circumstances on the working spouse would
be similar to consideration of impairment of earning capacity due to devotion to domestic
duties. See CAL. Crw. CODE §4801(a)(1).
185. Id.
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tion penalizes the working spouse for contributing to the welfare of
the couple during marriage.
Section 4801 requires the court to consider all the circumstances
of the parties and make explicit findings of fact with regard to the
factors enumerated for consideration in the section."8 6 Although the
court retains broad discretion over the amount of a spousal support
award,' 8 7 that amount must be determined by applying the factors
enumerated in section 4801.111 Consequently, a court that ignores the
contributions of the working spouse to the education earned by the
student spouse, merely because the working spouse is capable of some
measure of self-support may be committing an abuse of discretion.
If the disparity of post divorce standards of living between the two
spouses results from the contributions and sacrifices of the working
spouse for the education of the student spouse, the new provision
in Section 4801 clearly calls for a substantial award of spousal sup-
port to ameliorate the hardship on the working spouse. Two methods
of approaching spousal support have been suggested in this comment
that a court could employ under new Civil Code sections 4800.3 and
4801 to remedy the inequities in the student spouse/working spouse
divorce.
CONCLUSION
A spouse who contributes to the support of a student spouse in
the attainment of a professional education or training that substan-
tially enhances the earning capacity of the student spouse incurs op-
portunity costs that directly affect financial status. The working spouse
incurs these costs with the expectation that the marriage will endure
and that both spouses will share in the benefits of a higher standard
of living as a consequence of their investment in the human capital
of the student spouse. When divorce occurs before the community
has enjoyed these benefits, the working spouse is deprived of any
return on the investment. The student spouse, on the other hand,
leaves the marriage with all the benefits of the enhanced earning capaci-
ty earned for the student spouse in part by the efforts of the working
spouse. Many legal commentators have argued for the recognition
186. Id. §4801(a). The court may be required to make factual determinations regarding
the circumstances of the parties. Id.
187. In re Marriage of McNaughton, 145 Cal. App. 3d 845, 852-53, 194 Cal. Rptr. 176,
179 (1983) (abuse of discretion setting spousal support will be found only if no judge would
reasonably make the same order under similar circumstances).
188. In re Marriage of Fransen, 142 Cal. App. 3d 419, 424-25, 190 Cal. Rptr. 885, 887
(1983) (court must apply section 4801 criteria not just notice them).
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of a property interest in the professional education of the student
spouse that could be valued and divided upon divorce. California,
however, has rejected the notion of the professional education as pro-
perty that can be divided between the spouses upon divorce. Instead,
California enacted Assembly Bill 3000 which provides for reimburse-
ment upon divorce of community funds expended for the educational
costs of the student spouse. AB 3000 also requires courts to con-
sider, for the purposes of setting spousal support, the extent the work-
ing spouse has contributed to the attainment of the education by the
student spouse.
Mere reimbursement of the community for the costs of the education
of the student spouse is a very restrictive remedy that in many cases
does not address the fundamental inequities the working spouse suffers.
Spousal support often has been denied to the working spouse because
of a demonstrated capacity for self-support. Assembly Bill 3000 at-
tempts to increase the number of situations in which the working
spouse will be awarded significant spousal support. Employed as ad-
vocated by this author, the provisions of Assembly Bill 3000 can pro-
vide an equitable remedy for the working spouse who has contributed
to the professional education of the student spouse.
Daniel C. Cederborg
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